The State of Utah v. Lonnie L. Moore : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
The State of Utah v. Lonnie L. Moore : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul W. Mortensen; Attorney for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Moore, No. 870470.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1786
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
45.9 
DOCKET MO. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA^E OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
LONNIE L. MOORE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
N0. 870470 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DJISTRICT COURT OF 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
PAUL1 W. MORTENSEN 
131 East 100 South 
P. 6. Box 339 
Moatt, Utah 84532-0339 
Telephone: (801) 259-8173 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-5261 
Attorney for Respondent 
HARl^r 
0'?rk Bi*»;^cne C o 1 ^ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STAtTE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
LONNIE L. MOORE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
NO. 870470 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DlISTRICT COURT OF 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UfTAH 
HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
131 East 100 South 
P. Ol 
Moab 
Tele 
. Box 339 
, Utah 84532-0339 
'phone: (801) 259-8173 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-5261 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
.JUKliJUK'TLuM ,Ml|i - <! 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FUl. REVIE/: . . 1 
i,nr;.-M •'*•;, AUTHORITY 2 
STATEMENT OF /IiJJ CASE „ , , 4 
NATURE OF CAS , 4 
• , ' • ; . . - 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS , •• 8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY WHICH WOULD HAVE ASSISTED THE JURY TO FIND 
THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT VALUE 10 
POIN-I II 
. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TU ^UI^OJU' A 
FINDING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPKI 13 
THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUbEb OF 
THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS BY 
ESTABLISHING AN ARBITRARY 1,000 FOOT ZONE OF 
INCREASED CULPABILITY 15 
POINT IV 
THE STATUTE v^UL/iTES THE DUE 1MOCESS CLAUSES OF 
THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS BY ELIMI-
NATING THE ".: \S REA REQUIREMENT REGARDING 
CONCLUSIU 20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED Page 
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 US 632,39 L 
Ed 2d 52, 94 S Ct 791 17 
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 US 233,53 L Ed 2d 306, 
97 S Ct 2339 (1977) 19 
Morissette v. United States, 342 US, at 251, 96 L Ed 288 
72 S Ct 240 19 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 US 684, 44 L Ed 2d 508, 95 S Ct 
1881 (1975) 19 
People v. Hughes, 11 U. 100, 39 P. 492 19 
State v. Allen, 56 U. 37, 189 P. 84 (1920) 19 
State v. Ontiveros, Utah, 674 P.2d 103 (1983) 8,11,12 
State v. Smith, Kansas, 747 P.2d 816 (1987) 17 
State v. Taylor, Utah 599 P.2d 496 (1979) 15 
State v. Udell, Utah, 728 P. 2d 133 (1986) 13 
United States v. Bailey, 444 US 394, 62 L Ed 2d 575, 100 
S Ct 624 (1980) 19 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 US 441,446,37 L Ed 2d 63, 93 S Ct 
2230 17 
Yates v. Aiken, 484 US , 98 L Ed 2d 546, 108 S Ct 
(1988) 19 
CONSTITUTIONS CITED 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1 . . 2,17,19, 
20 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 17 
Utah State Constitution, Article I Section 7 2,17,19, 
20 
iv 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-2-2 (3) (h) . . . . 1 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (pre-1987) Section 
58-37-8 3 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) . 1,4 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 58-37-8 (5) (a) and 
(c) 1,2,4,9 
15 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 58-37-8 (5), 2,9,15 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 58-37-8 (5) (d). . . . 2,10,18 
v 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATES OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
LONNIE L. MOORE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 8710470 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The above Defendant-Appellant hereby respectfully submits 
the following brief. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from the Seventh Judicial District Court of 
Grand County, Utah. Jurisdiction for this Appeal is conferred by 
Section 78-2-2(3)(h), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that this is an appeal of a conviction of ei First Degree Felony. 
The Defendant was convicted following jury trial of having 
committed the offense of Distribution of 3 Controlled Substance 
for Value, Methamphetamine, a Schedule II Dtfug, within 1,000 feet 
of a school, a first degree felony, in violation of Sections 58-
37-8 (1) (a) (ii) and 58-37-8 (5)(a) and (c) of the Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FqR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented by tlhis appeal: 
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1. Did the Court commit reversible error in refusing to 
give Defendant's proposed instructions regarding Defendant's 
contention that he distributed drugs without receiving value? 
2. Was there sufficient evidence that the defendant was not 
entrapped? 
3. Does Section 58-37-8(5) of the Utah Code Annotated 
violate Due Process and Equal Protection by arbitrarily 
establishing a 1,000 foot zone of enhanced criminal culpability 
without requiring proof that children were present or targeted to 
be present at a drug transaction and without considering its 
unequal effect on residents of small towns? 
4. Does Section 58-37-8(5)(d) of the Utah Code Annotated 
violate Due Process by eliminating the mens rea requirement and 
by relieving the State of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant knew that his home was within 1,000 feet 
of a school? 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY 
Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment XIV, 
Section 1.: 
... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws* 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
2 
property, without due process of law. 
Section 58-37-8 of the Utah Code Annotated 1^53, as amended (pre-
1987) : 
(1) Prohibited Acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is 
unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
• • • 
(ii) to distribute for value or possess with 
intent to distribute for value a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
• • • 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (1)(a) with 
respect to : 
(i) a substance classified in Schedules [Schedule] 
I or II is, upon conviction, guilty of a second degree 
felony ... 
(5) Prohibited Acts — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions oi this section, 
a person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section . .. 
shall, upon conviction, be subjected to the penalties 
and classifications set forth in Subsection (5)(b) if 
the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary 
school; 
(ii) on the grounds of such a school; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, 
stadium, or other structure or grounds Which ar , at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through such a school; 
(iv) within on thousand feet 
facility, or grounds included in Subsec 
(ii), or (iii). 
of any structure, 
iions (5) (a) (i) , 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have 
been established would have been less than a first 
degree felony but for this subsection (5) is guilty of 
one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. 
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(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
subsection that the actor mistakenly believed the 
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time 
of the offense, or was unaware of the individual's true 
age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the 
location where the act occurred was not a described in 
Subsection (5)(a)• 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal of a conviction of a First Degree Felony. 
The Defendant was convicted following jury trial of having 
committed the offense of Distribution of a Controlled Substance 
for Value, Methamphetamine, a Schedule II Drug, within 1,000 feet 
of a school, a first degree felony, in violation of Sections 58-
37-8 (1) (a) (ii) and 58-37-8 (5) (a) and (c) of the Utah Code 
Annotated. The Defendant was sentenced and committed to be 
imprisoned in the Utah State Prison "for a period of not less 
than FIVE (5) YEARS and MAY BE FOR LIFE." (R. 4-5, 76, 99-100). 
The Defendant was found guilty following jury trial on 
November 12 and 13, 1987. He was sentenced on November 30, 1987, 
with the order of judgment and commitment being dated and entered 
on November 30, 1987. Notice of Appeal was filed on December 8, 
1987, and is timely pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Utah 
Supreme Court (RUSC). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant was found guilty of selling methamphetamines 
to an undercover agent within 1,000 feet of a public secondary 
4 
school in Moab, Grand County, State of Utah. 
On September 16, 1986, the Defendant was approached by a 
friend, Dan Ward, who was acting as a confidential informant, and 
who asked him if he could get some drugs. Either the Defendant 
(according to Ward's testimony [T. 130]) or "Steamer" (according 
to the Defendant's testimony [T. 122]), a mutual friend of Ward 
and the Defendant (T. 139-40), indicated it could probably be 
arranged. (T. 122,130). Later that evening Ward and Don Kelly 
an undercover narcotics agent came to the Defendant's house where 
Steamer, his girl friend Lauri and another lady were present and 
asked the Defendant to them some drugs. The Defendant did not 
have any drugs at his home but said that he would get them. Money 
was given to the Defendant and the Defendant went with "Steamer", 
whom the Defendant testified held the money (T. 124) to another 
location but later returned having been unable to purchase the 
drugs because the drug shipment had not arrived. (T. 54). The 
money was returned to the agent and t^ ien returned to the 
Defendant and Steamer when the Defendant said he thought he could 
get drugs from another source. The Defendant and Steamer (T. 
124) left again and returned again without having obtained any 
drugs. 
It was agreed that the Defendant and Steamer would be 
allowed to hold the money overnight and that they would try again 
on the 17th. (T. 54-55, 124). The next jnorning Steamer took 
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the money but was unable to make a buy. Later after another 
meeting with Ward and Kelly near his home the Defendant left and 
purchased methamphetamines. The Defendant returned to his home 
where he met Ward and Kelly and delivered the drugs, 
methamphetamines, Schedule II drugs, (T. 125), Upon delivery 
the Defendant was given a "line" of the drugs which was "cut out" 
from the drugs by the informant. (T. 46-59; 125-127) • The 
Defendant testified that all of the money he received was paid to 
his source for the drugs and that he neither used nor retained 
any of the money for himself. (T. 126). 
The defendant's home like almost every place in Moab, Utah 
was within 1,000 feet of a school. (R. 91-93). The Defendant's 
home was 568 feet seven inches from the edge of the Moab Middle 
School grounds. (T. 83). The transaction occurred without any 
children being involved or being present. 
The defendant raised the defense of entrapment claiming that 
the state had improperly used his friend Ward to entice him to 
acquire drugs. (R. 29, 58-75; T. 154-5). The facts regarding 
the entrapment defense are fully set forth in the Defendant's 
argument. 
The defendant also claimed that since he did not keep any of 
the money and, even by the State's witnesses testimony, he had 
only requested and been given the line of methamphetamines after 
he had already provided the drugs to the informant (T. 57), he 
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was not guilty of distributing drugs for value. The jury was 
instructed that it could find the Defendant guilty of a lesser 
included offense of distributing drugs without value. (R. 51-6, 
76; T. 152). However the Court refused to c^ ive the Defendants 
proposed instructions Numbers 1 and 2 (R. $1-6; T. 146-7) which 
read respectively as follows: 
You are instructed that the voluntary sharing of an 
unlawful substance obtained from a third party by a 
narcotics officer or agent with a person who has 
obtained the substance for the officer or agent from 
the third party does not constitute "distribution for 
value" within the meaning of the statut4. 
You are instructed that before you may find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant distributed 
methamphetamine for value, you must find that the 
defendant did more than simply make ^n accommodation 
call to obtain the methamphetamine pn behalf of the 
narcotics officer or agent. 
The defendant also challenged the constitutionality under 
the Utah and United States Constitutions c}>f the law making his 
alleged crime of committing a drug transaction within 1,000 feet 
of a school a first degree felony. (R. 3^-48). The Defendant 
contended unsuccessfully (R. 91-93) that the 1,000 feet of a 
school provision is unconstitutional since it violates the Due 
Process Clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions by 
establishing an arbitrary 1000 foot zone of increased culpability 
and it unconstitutionally eliminates the mens rea requirement 
regarding knowledge of the 1,000 foot area ahd relieved the State 
of its burden to prove each element of tHe offense beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. (R. 42-48). The Defendant's transaction 
occurred in Moabf Utah, in which, as in other small towns, 
schools are located within 1,000 feet of almost any place in the 
town. The Defendant's home was in the middle of the town's 
business district, and a tavern and liquor store were located 
closer to the school grounds than was his home. (R. 94-97). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. 
The Defendant, under his view of the facts, was guilty of no 
more than distribution without value. The Defendant had no drugs 
to sell at his home. While the Defendant received cash from the 
narcotics officers and informant, the Defendant used all of the 
cash to purchase the drugs for the narcotics officers and 
retained none of the cash for himself. The evidence thus raised 
the issue of whether the "line" of methamphetamine was 
voluntarily given to the Defendant by the informant after the 
drugs had been obtained and delivered to the informant rather 
than as formal consideration for having obtained the drugs. The 
Court erred in failing to give Defendant's proposed instructions 
No.s 1 and 2 which essentially quoted State v. Ontiveros, Utah, 
674 P.2d 103 (1983), and would have assisted the jury to consider 
the facts under the guidance of this court's holding in 
Ontiveros. 
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II. 
The informant, contrary to standards used to prevent 
entrapment testified to by the narcotics officers, centered upon 
his friends, the Defendant and Steamer, ^nd used their close 
relationships to entrap the Defendant into committing the crime. 
The conduct fell below the standards to v^ hich common feelings 
respond creating a substantial risk that a normal law abiding 
person would be induced to commit a cringe. The evidence was 
insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the Defendant had not been entrapped a^ nd , therefore, the 
Defendants conviction must be reversed. 
III. 
Section 58-37-8(5) Utah Code Annotated ennances the degree 
of culpability for persons who commit illegal drug transactions 
within 1,000 feet of a public or private school without regard to 
whether children are involved in orl witnesses to the 
transactions. The Defendant lived in a sn|all town, Moab, in 
which most everyone lives within 1,000 feet of a school. No 
children were involved in or witnessed the drug transaction in 
this case. The statute's establishment ofl the 1,000 foot area 
violates due process by arbitrarily creating a conclusive 
presumption that children were threatened by the transaction even 
though no children were present. The statutel also violates Equal 
Protection by subjecting residents of si^ all towns to more 
9 
frequently receive enhanced sentences than will residents of 
large cities. Therefore, the Defendant's sentence should not 
have been increased from a second to first degree felony. 
IV. 
Section 58-37-8 (5)(d) Utah Code Annotated provides that it 
is no defense that the person charged was not aware that his 
conduct occurred within 1,000 feet of a proscribed area. The 
statute thereby violates Due Process by creating an irrebuttable 
presumption that the Defendant knows the consequences of his 
conduct even when he doesn't, by discarding the mens rea 
requirement and by relieving the State of its burden to prove a 
critical element of the offense, knowledge, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
WHICH WOULD HAVE ASSISTED THE JURY TO FIND THE 
DEFENDANT GUILTY OF A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT VALUE. 
The evidence is uncontroverted that the Defendant received 
$275.00 from the informant and narcotics agents. (T. 53). The 
evidence is also uncontroverted that the Defendant used all of 
the money to purchase the methamphetamines from his source. (T. 
126). The Defendant asked for and received a line of the 
methamphetamine from the informant only after he delivered the 
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drug to the informant. Officer Don Kelly's testimony clearly 
reveals that the request for a line only caitie up after the drug 
had been obtained and delivered: 
Q When he returned, what did he do? 
A Mr. Moore invited ourselves and the confidential 
informant into his residence. 
Q Once you got inside, what did you do*^  
A Mr. Moore gave the confidential informant the 
controlled substance and requested tl^ at he receive a 
line or cut a line for use out of the controlled 
substance that he had delivered to the confidential 
informant. The confidential informant gave him some of 
the controlled substance at that time then and the 
confidential informant handed me the container 
containing the evidence. (T. 56-7). 
The Defendant testified that he and Ward had earlier discussed 
the Defendant receiving a line from a separate supply of drugs 
held by Ward but this line was never delivered. (T. 127). He 
testified that he had undertaken to obtain the drugs "as a 
friend. No other reason." (T. 126). Ward testified that he 
didn't know if the Defendant was to receive line of drugs or 
not for having obtained them: 
Q. ... (y)ou did know that he was going to take the 
money and use it to buy the drugs, because what he was 
going to get was a line out of it; isn't that correct? 
A. I couldn't really answer that. That's — I would 
think that's probably what he would do. (T. 141). 
Accordingly the issue was raised as to whether the distribution 
was one for value or not for value. 
In State v. Ontiveros, Utah, 674 If.2d 103 (1983) , the 
11 
defendant was given $40.00 by an agent, used all the money to 
purchase marijuana, delivered the marijuana to the agent and was 
then given some of the marijuana after the transaction had been 
completed. The court found that such evidence could not support 
a conviction of distributing marijuana for value stating: 
No evidence was presented at trial which showed 
the appellant to have distributed the marijuana for 
value. It was not shown that Ontiveros received any 
portion of the $40 that the officer gave him. The 
evidence only shows that the appellant acted as the 
officer's agent in making the purchase from a third 
party. Nor do we find that the voluntary sharing by 
the officer of one marijuana cigarette and the gift of 
a second sufficient to constitute a "distribution for 
value" within the meaning of the statute. The 
marijuana was voluntarily given to the appellant by its 
owner, the officer. The appellant clearly did not sell 
the marijuana in return for a share. 
Ontiveros at p. 104. 
Under Ontiveros and the facts in this case it was clear 
error for the court to refuse to give Defendant's proposed 
instructions 1 and 2 to the jury which read respectively as 
follows: 
You are instructed that the voluntary sharing of an 
unlawful substance obtained from a third party by a 
narcotics officer or agent with a person who has 
obtained the substance for the officer or agent from 
the third party does not constitute "distribution for 
value" within the meaning of the statute. 
You are instructed that before you may find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant distributed 
methamphetamine for value, you must find that the 
defendant did more than simply make an accommodation 
call to obtain the methamphetamine on behalf of the 
narcotics officer or agent. 
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State v. Udell, Utah, 728 P.2d 133 (1986) upheld a defendant's 
conviction where the defendant had taken the agent's money and 
applied the money to buy gas for himself in order to first drive 
around and find and to then purchase drugs f0r the agent. Udell 
does not excuse the court's failure to propetly instruct the jury 
in this case because there is no evidence here that the Defendant 
applied any of the money to his own use in order to hunt for and 
obtain the drugs. The Defendant here knew where to get the drugs 
and obtained them directly for the informant. 
The evidence clearly laid a basis for Ifhe court to give the 
requested instructions to the jury so that it could determine if 
the sharing of drugs was contractual or merely a voluntary and 
incidental sharing which occurred after the transaction was 
completed. The Defendant should be given an new trial with the 
jury to be instructed as requested by the Defendant. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT 
ENTRAPPED 
The informant, Dan Ward, a convicted felon (T. 136), serving 
time in jail, approached Moab police officer Doug Morck about 
cooperating in a drug investigation in order to "get some help". 
(T. 128-9). Thereafter, State Narcotics officer Garth E. 
Wilkinson met with Ward about assisting with some narcotics buys 
in Moab. Wilkinson testified that in order to prevent an 
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entrapment from occurring he told Ward: 
We discussed with who he might could do. During the 
time of the interview, I told him we didn't want to do 
any of his friends or anybody that — any girlfriends 
or anything like that, that it could be a problem— 
possibility of an entrapment type situation. (T. 94). 
Despite this instruction Ward immediately contacted the Defendant 
and Steamer. Ward while denying to be a friend of the Defendant 
admitted that he had partied all night at the Defendant's house 
on one occasion, had been to the Defendant's house six or seven 
times and that he was a friend of Lauri and "Steamer", mutual 
friends who were present when this drug transaction occurred. 
(T. 139-40) . The Defendant testified that Ward was a friend who 
had spent several days at his house, slept there a few times and 
with whom he had gone drinking at bars. (T. 122). The Defendant 
further testified: 
Q Why — why were you involved in this, Lonnie? 
A Dan Ward and I were pretty good friends or I assumed 
to be pretty good friends or something, I would 
imagine. I helped the guy out from being strung out on 
cocaine and speed and crank and everything else he 
could get himself systimized in. I brought him down 
off withdrawal several times and told him I would do it 
as a friend. No other reason. (T. 126). 
The informant, contrary to standards used to prevent 
entrapment and testified to by the narcotics officers, centered 
upon his friend, the Defendant, and used their close relationship 
to entrap the Defendant into committing the crime. The conduct 
as a matter of law fell below the standards to which common 
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feelings respond creating a substantial risk that a normal law 
abiding person would be induced to commit a crime as occurred in 
State v. Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (19179). Accordingly the 
Defendant's conviction must be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE 
UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS BY ESTABLISHING AN 
ARBITRARY 1,000 FOOT ZONE OF INCREASED bULPABILITY 
Section 58-37-8(5) as applicable to thils Defendant reads: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter show commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under t|his section • . 
. shall, upon conviction, be subjected to the penalties 
and classifications set forth in Subselction (5) (b) if 
the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private element[ary or secondary 
school; 
(ii) on the grounds of such a schqol; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, 
stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at 
the time of the act, being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through such a school; 
(vi) within one thousand feet of any structure, 
facility, or grounds included in Subsections (5)(a)(i), 
(ii), or (iii); or 
(v) with a person under 18 years <pf age regardless 
of where the act occurs. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have 
been established would have been less than a first 
degree felony but for this Subsection (5), a person 
convicted under this Subsection (5) is guilty of one 
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. 
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The statute arbitrarily establishes a one thousand foot area 
near a school for enhanced culpability without due regard for the 
circumstances existing in small towns like Moab, where almost 
all substance offenses by nature of the smallness of the town can 
be charged under this statute. This Defendant lived in a home in 
an area immediately surrounded by commercial stores, a law 
office, a bank and the post office. The home is located a half-
block from Main Street and about a block and a half away from the 
school property involved. (R. 28 [Stipulation of Facts]). 
A licensed tavern is located on the Defendant's block 
directly between the location of the Defendant's home and the 
school. A State liquor store, on the opposite side of the 
street, is also located between the Defendant's home and the 
school property and less than half a block from the school, 
showing that the Moab City governing body has recognized that the 
need to protect children does not and cannot practically extend 
far beyond the site in which the school is situated. (R. 28). 
Nothing in the transaction alleged against the Defendant 
indicates that children were involved in or even witnesses to the 
alleged transaction. 
The statute violates substantive due process rights in 
arbitrarily and capriciously 1) creating an irrebuttable 
presumption that children will be witness to or victims of drug 
transactions without regard to the actual presence or absence of 
16 
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in small towns are required to represent indigents more 
frequently than lawyers in large cities. The effect of the law 
in this case is to unfairly make almost every drug dealer in a 
small town the object of an enhanced sentence where 
proportionately fewer drug dealers in large cities will be so 
affected. 
POINT IV 
THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE 
UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS BY ELIMINATING THE 
MENS REA REQUIREMENT REGARDING KNOWLEDGE OF THE 1,000 
FOOT AREA 
No evidence was offered to prove that the Defendant knew 
that his home was located within 1,000 feet of a school ground. 
This was because Section 58-37-8 (5)(d) provides: 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
subsection that the actor mistakenly believed the 
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time 
of the offense, or was unaware of the individuals true 
age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the 
location where the act occurred was not as described in 
Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection 
(5) (a) . 
This section creates an irrebuttable presumption of knowledge of 
the location of the school. Again such an irrebuttable 
presumption is contrary to the Due Process Clauses of the Utah 
and United States Constitutions. 
The mens rea requirement may not be discarded absent 
compelling reasons. "Criminal liability is normally based upon 
the concurrence of two factors, 'an evil-meaning mind [and] an 
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unconstitutional process • His sentence must be reduced to that 
of a second degree felony. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's conviction should be reversed. If not 
acquitted by law on basis of entrapment the Defendant should be 
given a new trial with instructions to the trial court to 
instruct the jury as requested by the Defendant regarding the 
issue of value. The statutory provisions used to increase the 
Defendant's sentence to first degree level should be declared 
unconstitutional^ under both the State and Federal Constitutions 
and the Defendant subjected to nothing more than a second degree 
felony under any circumstances. 
Dated this /£ day of March, 1988. 
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